As the United States continues to debate whether to topple the government in Iran, academic research provides a stark warning: regime change is almost never a good idea. Even when it succeeds in removing an unwanted regime, it usually causes chaos, civil war, and unintended consequences. It may also foster factions that are more hostile to American interests than those who once held power.
The reasons for this are complicated. Some scholars see regime change as the result of long-run historical processes that shape so-called structural factors, such as a country’s political institutions, economic development, and culture. Others view regime change as the result of micro-events, such as a revolution or coup. In both cases, the goal is to replace one kind of regime with another.
Regardless of the explanation, the empirical record is dismal. Most armed regime-change missions fail to achieve their objectives, and they often lead to conflict, instability, and humanitarian crises. Those who advocate for regime change argue that it can be done more quickly and cheaply than sustained diplomatic pressure and engagement. But academic research shows that a country’s economic, security, and domestic political environment must be ready for political change in order for it to be successful.
This makes it difficult to change the government in countries with weak economies and fragile institutions, such as Venezuela, North Korea, or Iran. Moreover, the level of stability created after regime change depends on a variety of factors, such as how fast a country’s economy grows and what its local military does next.